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UNFAIR DISCLOSURE—ADOPTING A LIMITED
CONSULTANT COROLLARY FOR FOIA’S EXEMPTION
5 IN ATTORNEY WORK–PRODUCT CASES
PRESERVES LITIGATION PARITY FOR
AGENCIES LIKE THE FAA
ELLEN SMITH YOST*
THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA)’s Exemp-tion 5 allows government agencies to withhold requested
“inter-agency or intra-agency” documents if a party in litigation
with the agency would not be entitled to those documents.1 The
“consultant corollary,” a widely used interpretation of Exemp-
tion 5, defines documents produced for a government agency by
the agency’s outside contractor as “intra-agency” documents,
widening the exemption’s scope.2 In Rojas v. Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration, the Ninth Circuit rejected the consultant corollary,
holding that only documents actually produced by an agency
employee are within the text of Exemption 5.3 While the Ninth
Circuit’s Rojas approach respects FOIA’s pro-disclosure purpose
and strictly hews to the statute’s text, as applied to attorney
work–product privilege, it creates a “lopsided loophole” that al-
lows a party in litigation with an agency to unfairly gain privi-
leged information.4 To avoid this result, courts should instead
employ a limited consultant corollary, implicitly approved by the
Supreme Court in Department of the Interior v. Klamath Water Users
Protective Association,5 extending “intra-agency” status to memo-
randa produced by an agency’s neutral, hired consultant in prep-
aration for litigation. This Klamath-limited approach to the
* J.D. Candidate, 2021, SMU Dedman School of Law; B.A., 1998, Duke
University.
1 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2018).
2 See Rojas v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 927 F.3d 1046, 1054 (9th Cir. 2019).
3 Id. at 1058.
4 See id. at 1065, 1068 (Christen, J., dissenting).
5 Dep’t of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1 (2001).
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consultant corollary is “textually possible,” the Court has indi-
cated, and is necessary to give Exemption 5 its intended effect.6
FOIA, a 1966 statute intended to increase public access to gov-
ernment agency documents, was enacted in response to public
concern about the growing size, power, and opacity of adminis-
trative agencies after the New Deal.7 FOIA commands that “each
agency, upon any request for records . . . shall make the records
promptly available to any person.”8 Only if an agency “reasona-
bly foresees that disclosure would harm an interest protected
by” one of nine specified exemptions may the agency refuse to
release a requested record.9 FOIA’s nine exemptions were care-
fully crafted by a Congress seeking to balance the public interest
in open information with agencies’ ability to operate
effectively.10
FOIA’s Exemption 5 allows an agency to withhold “inter-
agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters that would not
be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation
with the agency . . . .”11 It is commonly applied in the contexts of
the attorney–client, attorney work–product, and delibera-
tive–process privileges.12 Legislative history shows Congress in-
tended Exemption 5 to incorporate traditional civil discovery
privileges, so that a person in litigation with an agency could not
use FOIA to unfairly gain the agency’s privileged documents.13
The scope of Exemption 5 is thus tethered to civil discovery law
governing the type of privilege claimed by the agency for the
requested document.
Discovery limits on attorney work–product privileged docu-
ments are defined by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(3)(A) that provides: “[o]rdinarily, a party may not dis-
6 Id. at 9–10 (quoting Dep’t of Justice v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1, 18 n.1 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting)).
7 See generally Martin E. Halstuk & Bill F. Chamberlin, The Freedom of Information
Act 1966–2006: A Retrospective on the Rise of Privacy Protection over the Public Interest in
Knowing What the Government’s Up To, 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 511, 517–28 (2006).
8 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (2018).
9 Id. § 552(a)(8)(A)(i)(I).
10 See Halstuk & Chamberlin, supra note 7, at 511–20.
11 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5).
12 See, e.g., Dep’t of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S.
1, 8–9 (2001). This Casenote considers only the consultant corollary’s application
in the attorney work–product privilege context.
13 See Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 154
(1975) (citing legislative history showing Congress’s intent to incorporate com-
mon law discovery rules in Exemption 5). See generally John C. Brinkerhoff, FOIA’s
Common Law, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 575 (2019).
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cover documents . . . prepared in anticipation of litigation . . . by
or for another party or its representative (including the other
party’s attorney, consultant, . . . or agent).”14 So, looking to tradi-
tional discovery limits, in an attorney work–product case, Ex-
emption 5 would exempt from FOIA disclosure documents
prepared by a consultant, at the request of agency lawyers, in
anticipation of litigation.15
However, the presence of the words “inter-agency and intra-
agency” in Exemption 5’s text complicates analysis of the ex-
emption’s proper scope.16 Strictly read, these words mean no
contractor-prepared memorandum can be withheld under Ex-
emption 5.17 Some have argued Congress well understood tradi-
tional discovery privilege law when enacting Exemption 5 and
nonetheless added the “inter- or intra-agency” language to fur-
ther limit agencies’ ability to withhold documents, favoring
FOIA’s purpose of disclosure over an agency’s privilege.18
Thus, Exemption 5 sets up a conflict for courts—how to give
effect to each of these conflicting congressional goals without
rendering the other meaningless. Strictly interpreting the “inter-
or intra-agency” text of Exemption 5 undermines the exemp-
tion’s purpose because it means sensitive documents created by
an agency’s consultant must be provided to a requestor even
when they would be privileged from discovery as attorney work
product under Rule 26.19 Yet, interpreting Exemption 5 too lib-
erally impermissibly ignores the “inter- or intra-agency” limita-
tion established by Congress and increases the exemption’s
14 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A) (emphasis added).
15 See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Grolier Inc., 462 U.S. 19, 25–27 (1983) (“Ex-
emption 5 incorporates the privileges which the Government enjoys under the
relevant statutory and case law in the pretrial discovery context.” (quoting Rene-
gotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft Eng’g Corp., 421 U.S. 168, 184 (1975))). One
difference to note in the standards applicable to FOIA litigation and non-FOIA
litigation is that FOIA exemptions are absolute while litigation privileges are qual-
ified. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM
OF INFORMATION ACT: EXEMPTION 5, at 2–3 (Aug. 26, 2019), https://www.justice.
gov/oip/page/file/1197816/download [https://perma.cc/S285-U3YT]. This
difference is beyond the scope of this Casenote but is another factor to consider
in preserving parity for agency and non-agency litigants.
16 See 5 U.S.C. § 522(b)(5) (2018).
17 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A).
18 See, e.g., Rojas v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 927 F.3d 1046, 1055–56 (9th Cir.
2019).
19 See Grolier, 462 U.S. at 25–28.
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scope, undermining FOIA’s overall purpose of disclosure.20 The
consultant corollary is one way courts have sought to resolve this
difficulty—by massaging the meaning of the term “intra-
agency.”
The consultant corollary interprets many documents pro-
duced by outside parties, at an agency’s request, as within the
definition of “intra-agency.”21 The corollary was developed soon
after FOIA’s enactment, when the D.C. Circuit opined that a
document generated by an outside consultant for the purpose
of improving an agency’s informed decision-making should “be
treated as an intra-agency memorandum of the agency which
solicited it” and thus as within the scope of Exemption 5.22 The
corollary has been adopted by the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth,
Eighth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits, and rejected by the Sixth and
(after Rojas) Ninth Circuits.23
Perhaps in response to some circuits’ overbroad application
of the consultant corollary, the Supreme Court discussed and
limited the corollary in Department of the Interior v. Klamath Water
Users Protective Association.24 In Klamath, the Department of the
Interior sought input from a Native American tribe on the im-
pacts a proposed water rights allocation plan would have on the
tribe’s lands and activities.25 When an association representing
other water rights claimants filed FOIA requests for memoranda
produced by the tribe for the agency, the agency claimed they
were protected under Exemption 5.26 Focusing on the fact that
the tribe was an interested party providing its analysis to the
agency, the Court held the consultant corollary did not apply
and the memoranda could not be withheld as “intra-agency”
documents under Exemption 5.27
20 See Dep’t of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 12,
16 (2001).
21 See Brinkerhoff, supra note 13, at 583.
22 See Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1078 n.44 (D.C. Cir. 1971); see also Brin-
kerhoff, supra note 13, at 583 & n.53. The corollary was developed in the deliber-
ative–process privilege context but has also been applied in the context of
attorney work–product and attorney–client privilege. Further discussion of this is
beyond the scope of this Casenote. See Klamath, 532 U.S. at 8–9.
23 See Rojas, 927 F.3d at 1065–67 (Christen, J., dissenting). Prior to Rojas, the
Ninth Circuit had implicitly employed the consultant corollary. See id. at 1054 n.4
(majority opinion).
24 See Klamath, 532 U.S. at 7–10; see also Brinkerhoff, supra note 13, at 583.
25 Klamath, 532 U.S. at 5.
26 Id. at 6.
27 See id. at 12 n.4.
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Klamath establishes a two-step analysis for Exemption 5.28 Step
one considers whether the document’s source is a government
agency—it is in this step that the consultant corollary would be
applied.29 Step two, if reached, looks to traditional litigation
privilege and thus is specific to the type of privilege asserted.30
Step one, the Klamath Court noted, “is no less important than
[step two]; the communication must be ‘inter-agency or intra-
agency.’”31
As the Court noted, at step one, the “most natural” reading of
“inter- or intra-agency” documents is documents produced by
agency employees.32 Certainly, the Court concluded, “intra-
agency” may not be read as a “purely conclusory term” that ex-
tends Exemption 5 protections to any document the agency
wishes to protect.33 However, the Court continued, quoting a
prior opinion by Justice Scalia, it is “textually possible and . . . in
accord with the purpose of [Exemption 5], to regard as an intra-
agency memorandum one that has been received by an agency,
to assist it in the performance of its own functions, from a per-
son acting . . . [as a] consultant to the agency . . . .”34 Such a
“consultant does not represent an interest of its own, or the in-
terest of any other client,” but merely “advises the agency that
hire[d] it . . . as an employee would be expected to do.”35
Because the tribe in Klamath was neither disinterested nor
hired, but an unpaid interested party standing to benefit from
the agency’s allocation of water rights, the Court held that the
corollary could not be applied.36 Not finding it necessary to de-
cide the correctness of the corollary in its purer, more common
form—applied to a neutral, hired contractor—where such facts
were not present, the Court went no further.37 However, by ap-
provingly discussing the consultant corollary as applied to a neu-
tral, hired contractor, the Court arguably implied its approval of
28 See id. at 8.
29 Id. at 8–9.
30 See id.
31 Id. at 9.
32 Id. at 9–10 (quoting Dep’t of Justice v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1, 18 n.1 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting)).
33 Id. at 12.
34 Id. at 9–10 (quoting Julian, 486 U.S. at 18 n.1).
35 Id. at 11.
36 Id. at 12.
37 Id. at 12 & n.3.
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a Klamath-limited consultant corollary where such facts were
present.38
As its facts show, Rojas was such a case.39 In 2015, Jorge Rojas
applied for an Air Traffic Control Specialist position with the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).40 The hiring process
largely depended on his performance on a “biographical assess-
ment,” developed for the FAA by an outside consultant.41 After
the FAA rejected Rojas for the position based on his assessment
performance, he filed a FOIA request seeking the assessment’s
validation data.42 In response, the FAA identified but declined
to release (citing FOIA Exemption 5) three memoranda summa-
rizing the assessment, prepared by the consultant at the request
of agency attorneys in anticipation of a class action lawsuit al-
ready filed by other rejected applicants.43 Notably, the attorney
actively representing the class action plaintiffs was Rojas’s FOIA
attorney.44 Implicitly relying on the consultant corollary, the dis-
trict court upheld the FAA’s right to withhold the consultant’s
memos as intra-agency attorney work product.45
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed that decision, holding
that documents produced by a hired contractor were not “intra-
agency memos.”46 The court wholly, not contextually, rejected
the consultant corollary, finding it textually incompatible with
step one of a Klamath analysis.47 A third-party consultant, the
Rojas court emphasized, “is not an agency.”48
One judge strongly dissented from the court’s rejection of the
consultant corollary, arguing the Klamath Court had implicitly
blessed the corollary’s use in situations such as the one in
Rojas.49 Moreover, the dissent noted the Supreme Court had
“consistently rejected” the idea that “parties in litigation with the
government” can use FOIA to circumvent discovery limitations
38 See id.
39 See Rojas v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 927 F.3d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir. 2019).
40 Id.
41 Id. at 1050–51.
42 Id. at 1051.
43 Id. at 1060–61 (Christen, J., dissenting).
44 Id. at 1060.
45 Id. at 1052, 1054 (majority opinion).
46 Id. at 1058.
47 Id. at 1054–56.
48 Id. at 1055.
49 Id. at 1067 (Christen, J., dissenting) (noting that “Klamath is more a benedic-
tion of the consultant corollary than an indictment”).
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and obtain information they otherwise could not.50 This, the dis-
sent noted, was precisely the situation the Ninth Circuit was ap-
proving in Rojas.51
This unfair effect on agency litigants, coupled with Klamath,
shows that the Ninth Circuit erred by rejecting the consultant
corollary in Rojas for three reasons. First, the Court’s deep and
lengthy analysis of the consultant corollary in Klamath, and its
ultimate narrow rejection of the corollary only as applied in that
case, strongly implies the Court’s approval of a limited version
of the corollary—where there is a neutral, hired consultant.52
Second, the circumstances in Rojas were those the Court implic-
itly approved in Klamath.53 And third, only by employing a lim-
ited consultant corollary in attorney work–product cases can
courts achieve proper balance between Exemption 5 and FOIA
generally, fulfilling Congress’s intent for the statute and its
exemption.
First, the unanimous Klamath Court’s lengthy and serious con-
sideration of the consultant corollary, and its subsequent narrow
rejection of only a highly distinguishable variant of the doctrine
(as applied to an interested party), implies approval of the corol-
lary in its purer form.54 In Klamath, eight pages of a twelve page
opinion are dedicated to discussing the consultant corollary and
distinguishing most corollary cases from the facts at hand.55 If,
after such thorough consideration, the Court had believed total
rejection of the corollary was clearly required by Exemption 5’s
text and FOIA’s purpose (as the Rojas court concluded),56 it
surely would have said so. Instead, the Court analyzed the text’s
“apparent plainness.”57 This use of the word “apparent” to qual-
ify the word “plainness” in describing Exemption 5’s text shows
the Court regarded “intra-agency” not as plain but as potentially
amenable to limited interpretation. The key “constant” in pure
consultant corollary cases, the Court emphasized, was that “the
consultant does not represent an interest of its own, or the inter-
50 Id. at 1062 (quoting United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 465 U.S. 792, 801
(1984)).
51 Id. at 1060–61.
52 See id. at 1067–68 (citing the Tenth Circuit’s reading of Klamath in Stewart v.
Dep’t of Interior, 554 F.3d 1236, 1244 (10th Cir. 2009)).
53 See Dep’t of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1,
10–11 (2001).
54 See Rojas, 927 F.3d at 1067–68 (Christen, J., dissenting).
55 See Klamath, 532 U.S. at 8–16.
56 See Rojas, 927 F.3d at 1058 (majority opinion).
57 Klamath, 532 U.S. at 9.
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est of any other client,” in advising the agency that hired it.58
Under these pure, limited circumstances, Klamath therefore im-
plies the consultant corollary may be used in step one of an Ex-
emption 5 analysis.
Further supporting this inference of majority Court approval
for a limited consultant corollary is the fact that the Klamath
opinion’s language most directly approving the corollary’s use
where there is a hired, neutral consultant comes from Justice
Scalia, who is no proponent of expansive functional interpreta-
tions.59 Justice Scalia, the opinion notes, found it “textually pos-
sible and . . . in accord with the purpose of [Exemption 5], to
regard as an intra-agency memorandum one that has been re-
ceived by an agency, to assist it in the performance of its own
functions, from a person acting . . . [as a] consultant to the
agency . . . .”60 Thus, by the depth and tenor of its discussion,
the Klamath Court implicitly approved the consultant corollary
as applied to an agency-hired, neutral third party who has deliv-
ered work product to the agency.
Second, the facts in Rojas satisfy Klamath’s standard for appro-
priate application of the consultant corollary.61 In Rojas, the
FAA hired a consultant “to review and recommend improve-
ments to the FAA’s hiring process” and later to analyze its hiring
assessments in preparation for litigation.62 The consultant was
not an interested party.63 The consultant’s work product was not
retained by the consultant but delivered to the agency.64 Rojas
involved a neutral consultant hired by the FAA to serve only the
agency’s interests.65
Third, only when a Klamath-limited consultant corollary is al-
lowed at step one of an attorney work–product Exemption 5
analysis does Exemption 5 deliver the litigation parity Congress
intended it to provide.66 Strict, textual interpretation of “intra-
agency” at step one, as in Rojas, destroys litigation parity in step
two. This is so because, in an attorney work–product case, re-
jecting the consultant corollary in step one forces an agency in
58 Id. at 11.
59 See id. at 9–10.
60 Id. (quoting Dep’t of Justice v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1, 18 n.1 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
61 See id. at 10–11.
62 Rojas v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 927 F.3d 1046, 1050–51 (9th Cir. 2019).
63 See id.
64 Id. at 1064 (Christen, J., dissenting).
65 See id.
66 See supra text accompanying notes 13, 15.
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litigation with a requestor to disclose consultant-generated doc-
uments even though they would be protected from disclosure
under Rule 26 at step two. Only agencies are subject to FOIA, so
this allows one-sided circumvention of discovery privilege and is
unfair to agency litigants.67
As the Rojas dissent noted, Rojas was a textbook example of
using FOIA to circumvent litigation privilege—the precise out-
come Congress sought to avoid by creating Exemption 5.68 In
Rojas, an attorney actively representing plaintiffs suing the FAA was
able to gain, via FOIA, FAA memoranda he could not obtain
through discovery.69 Under the precedent set by Rojas, litigants
have an unfair advantage over agency opponents—at least in the
Ninth and Sixth Circuits.70 This will chill agencies from seeking
the outside expert advice they may need to effectively serve the
public.71
In conclusion, to eliminate the litigation loophole created in
Rojas,72 the Court should again take up the consultant corollary
and hold what it implied in Klamath—that work product of an
agency’s disinterested, hired consultant is within the definition of
“intra-agency” for application of Exemption 5.73 Or, Congress
can act to add clarifying language to Exemption 5. Approving a
Klamath-limited consultant corollary—at least in attorney
work–product cases—will unify the circuits’ approaches to
FOIA’s Exemption 5, give effect to Congress’s intent for both
FOIA and this exemption, and create litigation parity between
agencies and their private party opponents—eliminating unfair
disclosure.
67 See Rojas, 927 F.3d at 1064–65, 1068 (Christen, J., dissenting).
68 See id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 13, 15.
69 See Rojas, 927 F.3d at 1061 (Christen, J., dissenting).
70 See id. at 1058–60 (majority opinion).
71 See Halstuk & Chamberlin, supra note 7, at 517–28.
72 See Rojas, 927 F.3d at 1068 (Christen, J., dissenting).
73 See Dep’t of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1,
10–11 (2001).
